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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
STATE V. COATES: STATEMENTS MADE TO A MEDICAL 
CARE PROVIDER ARE NOT ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE 
STATEMENTS MADE FOR MEDICAL DIAGNOSIS OR 
TREATMENT HEARSAY EXCEPTION WHEN THE 
DECLARANT WAS UNAWARE OF THE PURPOSE OF THE 
STATEMENT. 
By: Neal Desai 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that statements made to a 
nurse practitioner during examination were not admissible under the 
hearsay exception for statements made for medical diagnosis or 
treatment because the declarant did not know the statements were 
being made for medical diagnosis or treatment. State v. Coates, 405 
Md. 131, 950 A.2d 114 (2008). More specifically, the court stated that 
there is a lack of reliability in such statements, and therefore, the 
hearsay exception is inapplicable. Coates, 405 Md. at 147,950 A.2d at 
124. 
In September 2002, Kimberly Jenkins ("Jenkins") was involved in 
a romantic relationship with Frederick Roscoe Coates ("Coates"). 
When away from home, Jenkins often left Coates alone to take care of 
her daughter, Jazmyne T. ("Jazmyne"). Approximately one year later, 
it was discovered that Coates had sexually abused Jazmyne. Jazmyne 
was examined and interviewed by Heidi Bresee ("Bresee"), a nurse 
practitioner, to obtain a patient history and to conduct an external 
vaginal examination. During the interview, Jazmyne told Bresee, 
among other things, that Coates "put his private inside her private." 
After the interview and examination, Jazmyne asked Bresee, "Are you 
going to go out and find him now?" 
On October 7, 2004, the Grand Jury for Montgomery County 
indicted Coates on counts of second-degree rape and other related 
offenses. Coates filed a motion in limine, asking the circuit court to 
exclude Bresee's testimony. The court denied the motion, and Bresee 
testified at trial. On May 25, 2005, the jury for the Circuit Court of 
Montgomery County found Coates guilty. Coates appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which reversed, ruling that 
Bresee's testimony was improperly admitted and prejudicial. The 
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State filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland, and the court granted the petition. 
The hearsay exceptions derive from the common law theory that 
certain out-of-court statements have a minimal risk of inaccuracy and 
untrustworthiness. Coates, 405 Md. at 141, 950 A.2d at 121 (citing 5 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 
1420 at 251 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974)). The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland addressed the admissibility of Bresee's testimony under the 
hearsay exception in Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4). Coates, 405 Md. at 
141, 950 A.2d at 120. Under the Maryland rule, statements made for 
medical treatment or diagnosis are admissible if the declarant 
describes medical history, symptoms, pain, or the general character of 
the cause as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in 
contemplation of treatment. Coates, 405 Md. at 141,950 A.2d at 121 
(citing Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4)). This exception does not apply to cases 
where a non-treating physician is merely preparing to testify on the 
patient's behalf. Coates, 405 Md. at 142, 950 A.2d at 121 (citing 
Candella v. Subsequent Injury Fund, 277 Md. 120, 124,353 A.2d 910, 
914-15 (2003); Yellow Cab Co. v. Hicks, 224 Md. 563, 571, 168 A.2d 
501,505 (1961)). 
The court agreed with the intermediate appellate court, in that 
Bresee, in addition to having a cognizable medical reason for 
interviewing Jazmyne, also had a forensic purpose. Coates, 405 Md. 
at 143, 950 A.2d at 123. The court stated that the existence of dual 
medical and forensic purposes for an examination does not 
automatically disqualify an otherwise admissible statement under 
Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4). Id. at 143, 950 A.2d at 122 (citing 
Webster v. State, 151 Md. App. 527, 546, 827 A.2d 910,921 (2003)). 
However, the court conclusively noted that the overarching purpose 
Bresee had was investigatory in nature rather than related to medical 
concerns. Coates, 405 Md. at 143,950 A.2d at 122. 
Next, the court looked to whether the declarant believed there was a 
medical purpose for the examination. Id. at 144, 950 A.2d at 122. 
The court stated that the facts do not support a finding that Jazmyne 
would have understood that she was being seen for medical treatment 
or diagnosis because the interview with Bresee took place fourteen 
months after the last sexual-abuse incident and three weeks after her 
disclosure of the incident to her mother. Id. Further, the court 
determined that most eight-year-olds cannot distinguish "emergent 
circumstances or medical necessity in the absence of any medical 
complaints or symptoms." Id. at 144, 950 A.2d at 122. Finally, the 
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court found that Jazmyne's inquiry about whether Bresee would find 
Coates implied that Jazmyne did not understand that there was a 
medical or dual purpose for the examination. Id. 
The court distinguished this case from other significant Maryland 
cases. Id. at 144, 950 A.2d at 123. In one such case, the victim had 
the requisite motive for providing sincere and reliable infonnation 
because the victim's statement was "pathologically gennane" to 
treatment by a hospital nurse in an emergency setting. Id. (citing 
Webster, 151 Md. App. at 546,827 A.2d at 920). The court found the 
case at bar distinguishable because there was no emergency situation 
that would render Jazmyne's statements reasonably pertinent to 
diagnosis or treatment. Coates, 405 Md. at 145, 950 A.2d at 123. The 
court rejected the State's argument that Coates' identity was 
"pathologically gennane" to diagnosis or treatment because statements 
to a medical practitioner about the identity of the person who caused 
the injury are unlikely to be considered by the declarant as related to 
diagnosis or treatment. Id. at 146, 950 A.2d at 123. 
The court then compared the case at hand to another case where the 
intennediate appellate court reasoned that at the age of two, a 
declarant does not understand the purpose of a doctor's questions and 
therefore, does not have the self-interested motive to tell the truth that 
underlies the hearsay exception. Id. (citing Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. 
App. 1, 27, 536 A.2d 666, 678-79 (1988)). Similarly, here the court 
stated that it is unlikely that Jazmyne, a seven-year-old at the time of 
her statements to Bresee, would have known that Coates' identity was 
medically relevant in detennining her exposure to a sexually 
transmitted infection. Coates, 405 Md. at 147, 950 A.2d at 124. The 
court concluded that the record indicates Jazmyne's motive was to find 
Coates because he had not been apprehended. Id. 
By issuing a writ of certiorari, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
recognized the importance of this decision regarding the hearsay 
exception embodied in Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4). Coates clarifies 
Maryland law in establishing that where the declarant is unaware that 
the success of the diagnosis and treatment depends on the accuracy of 
his or her disclosure, the reliability of his or her infonnation is no 
longer presumed. As a result, under Maryland Rule 5-803(b)(4), 
lawyers in Maryland will now have a greater burden of showing that 
the declarant made his or her statement with the knowledge that the 
success of treatment was dependent on the declarant's accurate 
disclosure. 
